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Using a unique data set on store-level monthly prices of four homogenous products sold in Israel,
I study the existence and characteristics of the dispersion of prices across stores, as well as its persistence
over time. I find that price dispersion prevails even after controlling for observed and unobserved product
heterogeneity. Moreover, intra-distribution mobility is significant: stores move up and down the cross-
sectional price distribution. Thus, consumers cannot learn about stores that consistently post low prices.
As a consequence, price dispersion does not disappear and persists over time as predicted by Varian￿s
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Casual observation indicates that price dispersion is a readily observed feature of many markets:
deviations from the “law of one price” are the norm, rather than the exception. Indeed, a
variety of models have been developed in the Industrial Organization literature to account for
this fact. It is therefore surprising that price dispersion has not been the subject of a rigorous
and systematic empirical scrutiny: we do not have a clear sense of the magnitude of price
dispersion nor of its relationship to the type of product, and we know even less about the
reasons for its existence.
Indeed, since the seminal work of Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser (1979) there has not been
much empirical work documenting the extent and types of price dispersion. Lack of adequate
data is probably the main reason for this dearth of empirical work.1 In this paper, I use unique
data on store-level prices of four homogenous products sold in Israel to study the existence and
characteristics of the dispersion of prices across stores, and its persistence over time.
Many of the theoretical models on price dispersion are static by nature: they analyze a
single-shot pricing game between ﬁrms selling the same good. Cross-sectional price dispersion
is the result of a Nash equilibrium in pure or in mixed strategies (prices). In the pure strategy
case, some stores persistently sell their product at lower prices. If consumers can learn from
experience, this persistence seems rather implausible to sustain over time. In the mixed-strategy
case, stores randomize their prices and, therefore, do not post consistently low or high prices. As
a consequence, consumers cannot learn about stores that consistently have low prices (Varian,
1980). Hence price dispersion does not disappear and may be expected to persist over time.
This reasoning implies that if price dispersion is persistent, the ranking of stores in the
price distribution should ﬂuctuate over time. Giving empirical content to this hypothesis, and
testing it with the available data, is the second goal of this paper. To the best of my knowledge
this is the ﬁrst empirical study to analyze the evolution over time of the price distribution with
micro-level data. This is now feasible because, for each product, I have a long time-series of
monthly price observations by store.
The main result is that price dispersion across stores is prevalent and diﬀers across prod-
ucts in reasonable ways. Price dispersion prevails after controlling for observed and unobserved
product heterogeneity. In addition, intra-distribution mobility is signiﬁcant: stores move up
and down the cross-sectional price distribution. Thus, consumers cannot learn about which
1There is, however, some empirical work in the marketing literature based mostly on ad-hoc survey data.
Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser (1979) collected their own price data from stores selected from the Boston Yellow
Pages.
1stores have consistently low prices.
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief theoretical background in Section 2
and a description of the data in Section 3, the existence and characteristics of price dispersion
are examined in Section 4. In Section 5, I analyze the extent of intra-distribution mobility.
Conclusions close the paper.
2 Theoretical Background
The theoretical literature on price dispersion oﬀers a variety of models with non-degenerate
price distributions as the equilibrium outcome: stores charge diﬀerent prices for the same ho-
mogenous good. These models then rationalize the observed price dispersion as an equilibrium
phenomena.
In a world with identical sellers and buyers and with perfect information (alternatively,
when consumers can search costlessly for the lowest price) and no capacity constraints, the
unique Nash equilibrium is the perfectly competitive price (the Bertrand outcome). On the
other hand, imperfect information is not suﬃcient to support price dispersion. If search costs
are strictly positive the unique equilibrium is the monopoly price (Diamond, 1971). Imperfect
information makes it possible for ﬁrms to “capture” customers and act as local monopolists
because consumers must incur positive costs of ﬁnding lower prices.
The message from the Diamond model is that for price dispersion to exist in equilibrium,
there must be some heterogeneity among buyers and/or sellers.2 For example, when a mass
of consumers have negligible search costs, they will eventually get informed about the stores
charging the lowest price. These consumers are the “shoppers”. It then pays to deviate from
the monopoly price because stores that deviate will get all the shoppers. In equilibrium, the
shoppers will pay a low price, while the remaining consumers shop randomly and will pay either
the low or the high price.
Products that are otherwise homogenous are sold by diﬀerent sellers and some of this
heterogeneity is passed on to the products turning them, in fact, into “diﬀerentiated products”.
In the classical models of Hotelling (1929) and Chamberlin (1933), products diﬀer in their
2Diﬀerent models emphasize diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity. For example, price dispersion may arise
because of diﬀerences in the sellers’ production costs (Reinganum, 1979), diﬀerences in consumers’ search costs
(Rob, 1985), or in their beliefs about the price distribution (Rothschild, 1974), diﬀerences in the repetitiveness of
purchases and resultant customer loyalties (McMillan and Morgan, 1988), and diﬀerences in buyers’ information
about prices due to their random exposure to advertising (Butters, 1977). Even when consumers and ﬁrms
are identical ex-ante, a price dispersion equilibrium can arise as a result of ex-post heterogeneity in the price
information consumers receive (Burdett and Judd, 1983). Note that in all these models the heterogeneity pertains
to the buyers and/or to the sellers. It is therefore not that surprising that the equilibrium price distribution
reﬂects this underlying heterogeneity.
2location only. In these models also, product diﬀerentiation leads to monopolistic competition
and, consequently, to price dispersion.
Finally, if price dispersion for an homogeneous product is to persist over time, the equi-
librium price choices cannot be a pure strategy equilibrium. If some stores are always selling at
low prices, and if consumers can learn over time to identify these stores, then they will eventu-
ally shop at the low-priced stores and price dispersion will tend to disappear. If the dispersion
in prices persists over time then it must be that sellers vary their prices randomly over time
so that consumers cannot fully learn which store is selling at the lowest price, a point argued
forcefully by Varian (1980). The use of mixed strategies—sales—carries the empirical implication
that the position of the store (ranking) within the cross-sectional price distribution changes
over time in a random fashion.
In sum, theory tells us that lack of full information and some heterogeneity in the buyers
and/or sellers, which may be passed on to the products, is necessary for price dispersion to
exist. Furthermore, for price dispersion to persist over time, sellers should be changing their
prices (randomly) so as to preclude consumers from getting fully informed.
3T h e D a t a
The data set consists of price quotations obtained from retail stores by the Central Bureau of
Statistics (CBS). Once a month, the CBS samples prices on a variety of goods from a sample
of stores, and uses them to compute the monthly Consumer Price Index.3
I originally collected data on 31 products for the period January 1993—June 1994 (18
months). These products were selected after reviewing the list of major items in the CPI for
goods having a precise label that make them easily identiﬁable by the person collecting the
price data at the store. This should ensure that the prices over time correspond to the same
physical product. For example, I chose a product labeled “Brand A Instant Coﬀee (250 grams)”
but would not have selected it if, instead, it were labeled just “Brand A Instant Coﬀee”. In
many cases, price quotations of diﬀerent brands are obtained in diﬀerent stores and I know
which store is quoting which branch of the product.4
Many of these products, however, have relatively small number of stores with price
3Importantly, the price data are not “scanner” data. The prices are therefore “asking” prices. For many
products, asking and actual transaction prices are identical. The data set used by Lach and Tsiddon (1992,
1996) came from the same source (the CBS), but included diﬀerent products and covered a diﬀerent time period.
4For example, store 1 quotes the price of a bottle of brand A beer and store 2 quotes the price of a similar
sized bottle of brand B beer. In general, the brand quoted at the store does not change during the sample period.
3quotations in any month (less than 7-8 stores), making the estimates of price dispersion for
these products not very reliable. I therefore decided to focus on just four products with a
relatively large number of stores per month. For these products, the time series data were
extended until December 1996, totalling 48 months of price quotations. The list of products
appears in Table 1.
There is one durable good—a refrigerator—and three frequently purchased food staples—
chicken, coﬀee, and ﬂour. In any given month (out of the 48 months) there are at least 35 stores
with price data on the refrigerator, but no more than 43 stores. On average, in any month,
I have price data from 38 stores selling the refrigerator, and from 37 stores selling chicken,
but only from about 14-15 stores selling coﬀee tins or ﬂour packages. This results in that the
number of observations for the refrigerator and the chicken products is 2-3 times larger than
that for coﬀee and ﬂour.
There is variation in the number of reporting stores over time because the sample of
stores changes slowly over time (new stores are added to the sample while others drop out)
and also because stores that are out of stock when visited by the CPI surveyor are assigned a
missing value.5 On average, a store appears in the sample, i.e., has a price quotation, in over
75 percent of the sample period (in 37-40 out of the 48 months).
As mentioned above, the deﬁnition of the products is very precise and includes the brand
name, weight, model number, and other identifying information ensuring that the prices refer
to the same product across stores. The refrigerator, coﬀee and ﬂour are exactly the same
product in terms of physical attributes (brand, model, size, etc.). In short, these products are
“homogenous” as far as physical characteristics go.
The price of the chicken product refers to 1 kilogram of a whole frozen chicken. Re-
gretfully, there is no information on the speciﬁc brand quoted by the store. Frozen chicken,
however, is most likely a “generic” product because customers do not care (much) about the
brand.6 Frozen chicken comes in three sizes and I do have this information. Because size may
aﬀect the price per kilogram I will control for this size eﬀect when comparing prices across
stores. In any case, over 2/3 of the observations correspond to the smallest-sized chicken (Size
1).7
5This does not occur very frequently. When the prices in the months preceding and following am o n t hw i t h
a missing value remained constant, that constant price was imputed to the month having the missing value.
6From casual observation. Moreover, one brand dominates the market so that most quotations probably refer
to the dominating brand.
7The largest sized chicken is sold in only one store in the sample. 69 percent of the observations correspond
to the smallest chicken (Size 1) while 29 correspond to the intermediate size (Size 2).
4This concern for preserving homogeneity of the product across stores and over time
makes these data uniquely suited for the measurement and analysis of price dispersion. When
consumers buy many products at the same store, the prices of the various products sold by
the retailer are interdependent (Lal and Matutes, 1989). In this setting, one may naturally
be interested in the price dispersion of baskets of products across stores or, more generally, on
properties of the joint price distribution of many products. The available data do not allow me
to tackle this issue. I focus, instead, on the marginal price distributions, and their associated
dispersion measures, of the four products. These marginal distributions arise naturally in
models of equilibrium price dispersion in multiproduct settings (McAfee, 1995; Gatti, 2000).
4 Estimates of Cross-Sectional Price Dispersion
Because the general price level increased at an annual rate of about 10-12 percent during 1993-
96, nominal prices were transformed into real prices by dividing each price quotation by the
CPI monthly index. Henceforth, all prices are in terms of January 1993 prices in New Israeli
Shekels (NIS).8
4.1 Preliminary Estimates
Figure 1 displays kernel estimates of the log price distribution pooled over stores and months.
Log prices are expressed as deviations from the month’s average. Because adjusted log prices av-
erage to zero in every month all the variation in the densities is within-month (cross-sectional).
Obviously, the notion of “one price” does not hold in the data. In fact, prices exhibit
substantial dispersion. Table 2 presents simple means and variation measures of the real price
data (not in logs nor in deviation terms). Averaging over months and stores, the mean price
of the refrigerator during the four-year period was 3170 NIS with a standard deviation of 154
NIS. A kilogram of frozen chicken and coﬀee had comparable mean prices while ﬂour was an
order of magnitude cheaper.
The relationship between price dispersion and the type of product is interesting. Figure
1 and all the dispersion measures in Table 2 indicate that the refrigerator is the product with
the lowest price dispersion, while coﬀee exhibits the highest price dispersion. In fact, 50 (90)
percent of the refrigerator price quotations in the middle of the distribution are within 5 (15)
percent of each other. Given that a reasonable discount is about 5-10 percent of the price,
refrigerator prices are tightly concentrated in this region of the distribution. Nevertheless,
8The exchange rate in January 1993 was 2.76 NIS per U.S. dollar.
5prices are dispersed: the highest price is 43 percent higher than the lowest one. In the three
food products, the mid-50 percent of the prices are much more dispersed, and the highest price
is more than twice the lowest price.
In their sample, Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser (1979) found that the coeﬃcient of variation
decreases with the mean price of the good. Table 2 reports a similar ﬁnding. These results
are consistent with the view that, because of the presence of a ﬁxed cost component, search is
more valuable for high-price goods. In other words, search costs are low relative to the high
price of the good and, as a consequence, more searching for the lowest price is undertaken.
Eventually, consumers will get fully informed about which store is charging what price. Stores
will then have to price at approximately the same marginal cost—the Bertrand outcome—and
exhibit minimal price dispersion in equilibrium. On the other hand, in the case of low-price
items, search costs relative to the price of the good may be signiﬁcant for some consumers and
these will refrain from a complete search for the lowest price. An equilibrium can then exist
in which consumers with high search costs pay higher prices than consumers with low search
costs—the shoppers—resulting in price dispersion.9
4.2 Heterogeneity-controlled Estimates
Even though the products appear homogenous in terms of physical characteristics, all four
products are being sold by diﬀerent stores. Stores diﬀer in their location, reputation, credit and
repair policy, availability of complementary products, opening and closing hours and, generally
speaking, in their “quality of service”. Indeed, the estimates of price dispersion in Figure 1 and
Table 2 reﬂect cross-sectional heterogeneity in location, type of store and other observed and
unobserved characteristics of the stores selling the products. The variation in measurable and
immeasurable characteristics across stores renders the same physical product a “diﬀerentiated
product”. The observed price dispersion may therefore reﬂect the equilibrium prices of a
monopolistic competitive model with diﬀerentiated products (Hotelling, 1929; Chamberlin,
1933).
Thus, a simple explanation for the observed existence of price dispersion relies on product
heterogeneity. The challenge is to verify whether prices continue to be dispersed after removing
the main sources of heterogeneity. Some of the heterogeneity can be controlled for using
available information in the CBS ﬁle on the type of store (grocery, supermarket, delicatessen,
open market, etc.) selling the product and on the city where the store is located. In addition,
9A mitigating argument is the strong negative association between the price level of the product and the
frequency of purchase. In general, consumers would search less intensively for the lowest price of an infrequently
purchased good.
6given the panel structure of the data, other store characteristics that remain constant over
time can be captured by a ﬁxed “store eﬀect” while ﬂuctuations in the prices of the products
common to all stores—aggregate ﬂuctuations—above and beyond the ﬂuctuations in the CPI are
accounted for by a “month-eﬀect”.
This suggests the use of the following empirical model as a way of controlling for observed
store characteristics, for time-invariant unobserved store-characteristics, and for aggregate time-
varying eﬀects,
logPit = pit = µ + αi + δt + γc + λτ + εit (1)
where αi is a store eﬀect, δt is a month eﬀect, γc captures the eﬀect of the store’s location
(city) and λτ estimates the type-of-store eﬀect.10
The residual variation is the focus of interest here. The residual price b εit can be in-
terpreted as the price of an homogenous good after controlling for the eﬀects of variation in
“quality of service” (including location and type of store) and time eﬀects in the prices of the
same good across stores. The residual is, in fact, approximately equal to the percentage devi-
ation of a store’s price from the geometric mean price in the month. The distribution of these
residuals can be compared across products because scale eﬀects are absorbed in the overall
constant.
Equation (1) was estimated by OLS for each product separately and b εit was computed.
These residual prices average to zero for a given store over time, for a given month across stores,
for a given city (across stores and months), etc.11 Note that not all eﬀects can be separately
identiﬁed due to the many instances of perfect multicollinearity (e.g., when there is only one
store in the city). This does not aﬀect the estimation of εit—our primary interest—but it may
cast some doubts about the relevance of some of the signiﬁcance tests of the group eﬀects in
equation (1) presented in Table 3.
Most group eﬀects are signiﬁcant, except for the type-of-store eﬀect which does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect prices in two out of the three products with type-of-store data. Somewhat
10For notational convenience the price quotations (stores) are indexed by the store index i =1 ,...,nt, and the
month index t =1 ,...,48, but not by the city and type. αi,δt,γc and λτ are the coeﬃcients of dummy variables.
11The parameters in (1) have no causal interpretation: equation (1) is the best linear projector of log price
using the observed store characteristics. This equation was modiﬁed to ﬁt the particular features of each product.
All the stores selling the refrigerator are of the same type so that no “type eﬀect” can be identiﬁed. For chicken,
a size dummy was added to the regression.
7surprisingly, the monthly dummies also come in signiﬁcant in the three food products suggesting
that there is an aggregate component aﬀecting store prices not captured by the CPI.
From the R20s of the regressions in Table 3 we see that although much of the variation in
prices can be accounted for by the variation across cities and types of store, by the time-invariant
store characteristics, and by aggregate shifts in the price distribution, there still remains a
sizable part of the total variation to be accounted for, particularly for the refrigerator and
chicken products. The R2, however, is a relative measure of the variation in prices explained by
the model, and is not informative on the absolute magnitude of the variation left unexplained.
Thus, even the 9 percent of unexplained variation in coﬀee may be “large” when compared to
the variation in a similarly priced product such as chicken (whose R2 is 60 percent).
T h ed i s p e r s i o no fp r i c e si no u rs a m p l ec a nb es e e ni nF i g u r e2w h i c hd i s p l a y st h ee v o l u t i o n
of ﬁve quantiles of b εit over time. The ﬁrst impression from Figure 2 is that price dispersion
continues to characterize the cross-sectional distribution of prices even after controlling for
heterogeneity. The second feature of Figure 2 is that the cross-sectional distributions appear to
be quite stable over time in the sense that they appear to be drawn from the same population
(except, possibly, for coﬀee in the ﬁrst half of the sample period).
Table 4 presents the time-averages of some of these quantiles and associated dispersion
measures. Roughly speaking, 50 percent of the refrigerator and food prices in the middle of the
distribution diﬀer at most by about 3 and 8.5 percent, respectively. Compared with the results
in Table 2 (column 4), the interquartile range declines by about half for the ﬁrst two products,
but declines even more for coﬀee and ﬂour from 51 and 19 percent to 5 percent, respectively.
Notice the similarity of the estimated interquartile ranges and standard deviations of b εit in
Table 2.
Again, the refrigerator—the most expensive and less frequently purchased good—has the
lowest price dispersion according to all three variability measures. The interquartile range tells
us that, on average, half of the stores sell the refrigerator within a 3.1 percent price diﬀerence,
or almost 100 NIS, of each other.12 This is not to say that prices are not dispersed. The stores
at either end of the distribution—in the bottom and top 5 percent—post prices that diﬀer by at
least 10.5 percent or about 333 NIS. The product exhibiting the highest dispersion in prices is
chicken. The highest- and lowest-priced 5 percent of the stores are at least 24 percent apart.
Given the stability of the cross-sectional distribution, I pooled the 48 cross-sectional
densities and interpret the result as an estimate of the cross-sectional residual price distribution.
Figure 3 shows kernel estimates of the density of residual log prices (b εit) for the 48 months
12The aveage real price during the sample period was 3170 NIS (Table 1).
8pooled together (recall that residual prices average to zero in every month, city, store, etc.).
The standard deviation and quantiles of these distributions can be read oﬀ Table 4.13,14
In sum, controlling for permanent observed and unobserved diﬀerences across stores does
indeed account for a large portion of the dispersion in real prices, but there is still some price
dispersion which cannot be attributed to heterogeneity as measured here.15 Moreover, the
cross-sectional distributions are quite stable over time.
5 Intra-distribution Dynamics
The ﬁnding that prices vary across stores within any single month, and that this dispersion
is roughly constant over time, does not imply that stores do not change their prices over
time. Intra-distribution mobility—changes over time in the position of stores within the price
distribution—is perfectly consistent with a stable cross-sectional distribution.
What can be said about the transition from one cross-sectional price distribution to
another. Are stores’ positions in the distribution stable or changing over time? If the stores’
position change, do stores charge low prices for short periods of time and then set high prices for
longer periods? Or are stores adjusting their prices up and down to keep buyers from learning
about the identity of the store charging the lowest price, as suggested by Varian (1980)?
These are interesting questions related to the existence and nature of mobility within the
cross-sectional distribution, or intra-distribution dynamics, and some of them are addressed in
this section. To the best of my knowledge, these issues have never been empirically confronted
in the context of price dispersion.
5.1 Are Stores’ Positions Changing?
Most of the issues of interest can be addressed by assigning each store to a quartile in the cross-
sectional distribution of residual prices b εit and analyzing the evolution of these assignments over
time. To be precise, I use Ft, the empirical distribution of residual prices in month t, to deﬁne
three cutoﬀ points q1t,q 2t and q3t as follows: 0.25 = Ft(qt1), 0.5=Ft(qt2), and 0.75 = Ft(qt3).
13The estimated moments and quantiles of the pooled b ε
0s underlying the densities in Figure 3 are weighted
averages of the cross-sectional (monthly) estimated moments and quantiles with weights equal to the proportion
of observations in the month out of the total number of observations (over all 48 months). The estimates in
Table 4 are unweighted averages, i.e., they assume that the number of observations is the same in each month.
14In general, the estimated densities are more concentrated (squeezed) toward their mean (zero) than a normal
density with a similar mean and variance.
15Recall, however, that theoretical models require some sort of heterogeneity in products-sellers-buyers for
price dispersion to exist in equilibrium.
9Each residual price b εit was then assigned to the corresponding quartile in the obvious way.
Thus, a store with residual price between qt2 and qt3 is in the third quartile of the cross-
sectional distribution in month t, while a store with residual price larger than qt3 is in the
fourth quartile meaning that it has a price higher than 75 percent of all the stores in month t.
Figure 4 shows bar charts of the percentage of months spent by each store in each of the
four quartiles ordered from the ﬁrst quartile at the bottom to the third one at the top (the
fourth quartile is the complement to 1). Note that the position of the store in the distribution is
nothing but stable. As evidenced by the length of the bars, the vast majority of the stores spend
some time at the lower and upper quartiles of the price distribution, but these percentages vary
considerably across stores.
Ranks provide even more precise information about the stores’ positions in the cross-
sectional distribution. Examination of the stores’ ranks reaches a similar conclusion. More
often than not, stores are observed to have the lowest and highest ranks at least once during
the sample period. Indeed, there is considerable variation in the ranks assigned to a given store
over time. This can be seen in Figure 5 where their standard deviation are plotted in ascending
order.16
5.2 How Long do Stores Remain in the Same Position?
Having established that stores change their position in the cross-sectional price distribution,
I would like to enquire about the frequency of these changes. Do stores have long continuous
spells in a given quartile of the distribution, or do they jump around from quartile to quartile?
That is, I am interested in the duration of spells in each quartile of the distribution.
Table 5 presents features of the distribution of durations in each quartile. Duration is
deﬁned as the number of consecutive months at which the store has a (residual) price in a given
quartile. The store can have several spells of diﬀerent durations in each quartile. The statistics
in Table 5 refer to the pooled data on durations (i.e., within and across stores).
D u r a t i o n so fl e n g t ho n em o n t ha p p e a rt ob et h er u l e ,i np a r t i c u l a rf o rt h ef o o dp r o d u c t s .
In stores selling the refrigerator, approximately 30 percent of the spells in each quartile last
one month. The proportion of spells lasting one month increases to about 40 percent in stores
selling ﬂour, and to 57 and 63 percent in stores selling chicken and coﬀee, respectively. There
are no striking diﬀerences in the duration distribution across quartiles.
16To get some idea of the magnitude of the standard deviation recall that ranks are uniformly distributed on








10As indicated by the median duration (last row), (at least) 50 percent of the spells in a
given quartile last no more than one month for coﬀee and chicken (except q4 in the latter),
and at most 2-3 months for ﬂour and for the refrigerator. This means that there is a lot of
“jumping” around the cross-sectional distribution, particularly for coﬀee and chicken.17
5.3 Transitions between Positions
If duration in a given quartile is short then there is a high probability that, say, next month
the price will jump to a diﬀerent quartile of the distribution. The transition process from
one cross-sectional distribution (Ft) to another (Ft+1) can be modelled by assuming that this
transition is done in a Markovian fashion through a 4 × 4 transition matrix Tt where its ijth
entry gives the probability that a store in the ith quartile in month t (i.e., with a residual
price between qti−1 and qti)m o v e st ot h ejth quartile in month t +1 . Consistent estimates
of Tt are the sample proportions of stores moving from one quartile to another. Assuming a
time-invariant transition matrix, the 47 estimated transition matrices—one for each transition
between months t and t+1—can be averaged to produce a single (estimated) transition matrix
T.18
Examination of T gives a good idea on the extent of intra-distribution mobility. If stores
keep their positions over time—lack of mobility—then T should have “large” diagonal entries.
If there is a lot of intra-distribution dynamics—mobility—this would be reﬂected in “large” oﬀ-
diagonal probabilities.
The results are presented in Table 6 when the time-horizon is one month (i.e., a transition
between month t and month t +1 ) . The probability of remaining in the same ﬁrst quartile
is higher for stores selling the refrigerator (0.78) and ﬂour (0.71) than for the stores selling
chicken (0.51) or coﬀee (0.43). This result accords with the duration results in Table 5.19 In
fact, the smaller diagonal terms in the food product transition matrices imply that the latter
two products have higher probabilities of moving up and down the price distribution than
17I recomputed the quartiles and associated duration statistics in Figure 4 and Table 5 using the observed
price of the store—instead of its residual price—and found qualitatively similar features: stores still change their
positions in the cross-sectional distribution but do so somewhat less often.
18The Markovian and homogeneity assumptions correspond to Quah’s (1993) insight originally developed to
analyze the transition and convergence of country incomes over time. The matrix T is the weighted average of
the estimated transition probabilities for each month with weights equal to the proportion of observations in
each cell.
19The probability of jumping to another quartile conditional on being in a given quartile (row) is the sum of
the oﬀ-diagonal probabilities in a given row. The (unconditional) probability of jumping is the average of the
conditional probabilities which equals the probability of observing a one-month spell.
11stores selling the refrigerator or ﬂour. Note that mobility is weaker at the extremes of the price
distribution reﬂecting, perhaps, some (time-varying) unobserved heterogeneity across stores
not captured by (1).
Extending the time-horizon to from 1 to 6 months (i.e., a transition from January to July
to January, etc.) increases intra-distribution mobility (Table 7). As expected, the probability of
remaining within the same quartile after 6 months is quantitatively lower than the probability
of the same event after 1 month. Roughly speaking, these estimates imply that a consumer
that knows the position (quartile) of each store during month t will have approximately a 30-35
percent probability—the average of the estimated diagonal terms—of observing the store in the
same position (quartile) during month t +6 .20
The estimated transition probabilities are based on a series of strong assumptions re-
garding the order of the Markov process, the time-horizon, the choice of cutoﬀ points in the
distribution, etc.21 Nevertheless, it is comforting that the conclusions reached here are consis-
tent with the duration results in the previous subsection.
5.4 Rank Correlations
A more basic feeling for the persistence in the stores rank can be obtained from the correlations
between stores’ ranks in the residual price distribution across two diﬀerent months. Figure 6
plots the correlations between the stores’ ranks in January 1993 and their ranks in all subsequent
months (this is just one possible choice out of the 47 possibilities). As expected, the correlations
between the ﬁrst and subsequent months t is positive for almost all months within the year,
and then oscillate around zero—sometimes considerably. Yet after the ﬁrst 4-6 months these
correlations are not statistically diﬀerent from zero.22 This means that knowledge of a store’s
position in any given month is useful in predicting its position in the price distribution up to
no more than 4 to 6 months ahead.
20As Column # indicates many observations are lost when moving from Table 6 to Table 7 because only stores
with consecutive data are included. The literature oﬀers many indices of the degree of intra-distribution mobility
but, given the small dimension of the transition matrix and the controversy regarding the interpretation of some
of the indices, I prefer to present the whole transition matrix here (see Geweke et al., 1986).
21One could in principle generate the 6-month transition from the 1 month-transition matrix. However, it is
well known that there may be inconsistencies across T matrices estimated over shorter and longer time-horizons.
This is the case here as well.
22To assess the statistical signiﬁcance of these estimates we compare them to the exact critical values for the
null hypothesis of no rank correlation. These critical values, tabulated in Table Q of Siegel and Castellan (1988),
depend on the number of stores involved in the calculation of the correlation. Using the average number of stores
from Table 1, the critical values at a 5 percent signiﬁcance level for the estimated rank correlation are 0.32 for
the refrigerator, 0.33 for chicken, 0.56 for coﬀee, and 0.54 for ﬂour.
12In sum, the stability of the cross-sectional price distribution over time masks signiﬁcant
intra-distribution dynamics. Consumers cannot learn in a deﬁnite way which store is charging
what price because the ranking of stores in the distribution changes over time. According to
one measure, a consumer that knows the position of each store during a given month will have
approximately a 30-35 percent probability of observing the same position six months ahead.
According to another measure, after approximately 4-6 months there is no correlation between
the initial rank and the current one. This “short memory” feature of the markets—a reﬂection of
the signiﬁcant turbulence in the evolution of the cross-sectional price distribution—is consistent
with a model of consumer search and stores’ use of mixed price strategies (sales). As argued by
Varian (1980), this would preclude rational searchers from identifying the lowest-priced store
over time.
6 Conclusions
This paper measured and analyzed the price dispersion of four homogeneous goods across stores
in Israel over a period of 48 months (1993-1996). The main ﬁnding is that price dispersion pre-
vails after controlling for observed and unobserved product heterogeneity. The cross-sectional
price distribution is quite stable over time, but this stability masks an intensive process of stores’
repositioning within the cross-sectional distribution; there is substantial intra-distribution mo-
bility. This ﬁnding is consistent with Varian’s (1980) argument about the need for “sales”
(randomized prices) when consumers search rationally for the lowest price.
I st h ee x i s t e n c eo fp r i c ed i s p e r s i o nar e ﬂection of strategic behavior or is it driven by
stores’ heterogeneity? As previously observed, price dispersion prevails even after controlling
for product heterogeneity. Thus, heterogeneity cannot be the only reason for the observed
dispersion. Of course, it may still be unobserved (and uncontrolled for) heterogeneity that is
driving this result. But time-invariant heterogeneity has been controlled for, and even if it were
not, this type of heterogeneity cannot generate the observed intra-distribution dynamics. In
principle, time-varying heterogeneity can account for both cross-sectional price dispersion and
intra-distribution dynamics. For example, prices may respond to the arrival of store-speciﬁc
(idiosyncratic) shocks, a component of the ε0
its in (1). The problem with this interpretation is
that we would need a lot of idiosyncratic “large” shocks arriving every month to destroy the
intertemporal rank correlation. It is diﬃcult to believe that this is happening at the level of
the individual store. Thus, again, heterogeneity alone cannot be the whole story. Indeed, while
it is tempting to interpret the evidence of intra-distribution mobility as reﬂecting some form
of strategic interaction this is not entirely warranted by the paper’s results. In order to say
13something about this, additional empirical research is required.
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16Table 1:List of Products
Product No. of Stores Months in Sample No. of Observations
Mean (Min, Max) Mean (Std)
Refrigerator 38.0 (35, 43) 38.0 (14.1) 1826
Chicken 36.5 (33, 42) 39.8 (13.3) 1751
Size 1 25.1 (22, 29) 40.1 (12.7) 1203
Size 2 10.4 (9, 12) 38.5 (14.9) 500
Coﬀee 13.5 (12, 15) 40.6 (12.6) 649
Flour 14.6 (13, 16) 36.9 (13.0) 701
Table 2: Simple Statistics







Refrigerator 3170.1 (153.9) 4.85 1.05 1.15 1.43
Chicken 9.78 (1.13) 11.55 1.17 1.44 2.06
Size 1 9.69 (1.10) 11.39 1.15 1.45 2.03
Size 2 9.92 (1.18) 11.89 1.18 1.46 1.83
Coﬀee 11.85 (2.33) 19.66 1.51 1.79 2.30
Flour 1.55 (0.21) 13.35 1.19 1.41 2.00
Prices not in logs and deﬂated to January 1993. Estimates are on the pooled data,
i.e., over months and stores.The number of observations appears in Table 1.
Table 3: Tests for Group Eﬀects
p-value of F-test
Refrigerator Chicken Coﬀee Flour
Month Eﬀects 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Store Eﬀects 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00
City Eﬀects 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Type Eﬀects — 0.00 0.12 0.21
Size Eﬀects —0 . 0 0 — —
N 1826 1751 649 641∗
R2 0.50 0.60 0.91 0.83
R
2
0.47 0.57 0.90 0.81
B a s e do nO L Se s t i m a t e so fe q u a t i o n( 1 ) .S t o r e s
selling the refrigerator are all of the same type.
∗The ﬂour equation is 60 observations short from the number
in Table 1 because two stores have missing type data.
17Table 4: Price Dispersion Measures
Monthly Averages
Product Standard Quartiles Diﬀerences in Quantiles
Deviation 25% 75% 75%-25% 95%-5%
Refrigerator 0.0323 -0.0171 0.0143 0.0313 0.1048
Chicken 0.0728 -0.0408 0.0458 0.0865 0.2361
Coﬀee 0.0585 -0.0232 0.0306 0.0538 0.2205
Flour 0.0436 -0.0232 0.0247 0.0479 0.1600
Price dispersion based on b εit.
Averages over 48 months of the plots in Figures 3.
Table 5: Distribution of Durations by Quartile
(percentages)
Duration









q1 q2 q3 q4
27.2 33.3 30.1 25.2
21.1 21.4 22.7 20.9
8 . 81 4 . 91 8 . 41 1 . 3
10.5 15.5 11.0 13.0
9.7 6.6 9.8 4.4
22.7 8.4 8.0 25.2
4.02 2.70 2.77 4.03
3223
Chicken
q1 q2 q3 q4
57.2 61.2 60.9 45.1
22.5 21.7 24.8 19.6
8.6 9.7 10.2 13.0
4.1 4.7 1.5 10.3
1.4 0.8 1.5 6.0
6.2 1.9 1.1 6.0
1.99 1.69 1.61 2.42
1112
Duration









q1 q2 q3 q4
66.3 66.7 61.9 55.8
20.0 25.7 21.6 20.9
7 . 41 . 99 . 38 . 1
1 . 12 . 94 . 19 . 3
1 . 11 . 93 . 12 . 3
4 . 10 . 90 . 03 . 6
1.71 1.52 1.65 1.94
1111
Flour
q1 q2 q3 q4
36.7 45.1 38.6 40.0
8 . 21 9 . 72 7 . 11 4 . 0
18.4 16.9 17.1 16.0
14.3 9.9 7.1 8.0
10.2 2.8 4.3 4.0
12.2 5.6 5.8 18.0
3.20 2.28 2.30 3.22
3222
18Table 6: One-Step Transition Matrix (1-month horizon)
Refrigerator
# q25 q50 q75 ∞
439 q25 0.78 0.11 0.07 0.04
439 q50 0.18 0.65 0.09 0.08
440 q75 0.02 0.22 0.65 0.11
447 ∞ 0.03 0.02 0.17 0.78
Chicken
# q25 q50 q75 ∞
429 q25 0.51 0.20 0.18 0.11
423 q50 0.26 0.42 0.23 0.09
418 q75 0.13 0.27 0.39 0.21
431 ∞ 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.61
Coﬀee
# q25 q50 q75 ∞
155 q25 0.43 0.21 0.13 0.23
155 q50 0.23 0.35 0.30 0.12
154 q75 0.10 0.32 0.41 0.17
164 ∞ 0.23 0.11 0.17 0.49
Flour
# q25 q50 q75 ∞
152 q25 0.71 0.10 0.09 0.10
158 q50 0.20 0.58 0.11 0.11
155 q75 0.06 0.27 0.59 0.08
157 ∞ 0.02 0.06 0.21 0.71
B a s e do nr e s i d u a lp r i c e sb ε. Column # gives the number of price quotations in the initial
quartile which equals the sum over months of the number of stores in each quartile.
A store enters the calulations only when it has data on two consecutive periods. Entries
are weighted averages of the month-speciﬁc probabilities of moving from one quartile
to another with weights given by the proportion in each month of the total observations
in the intial quartile (Column #)
19Table 7: One-Step Transition Matrix (6-month horizon)
Refrigerator
# q25 q50 q75 ∞
64 q25 0.38 0.25 0.17 0.20
60 q50 0.32 0.25 0.16 0.27
63 q75 0.14 0.32 0.33 0.21
68 ∞ 0.18 0.18 0.29 0.35
Chicken
# q25 q50 q75 ∞
65 q25 0.31 0.34 0.24 0.11
58 q50 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.17
60 q75 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.32
64 ∞ 0.20 0.13 0.23 0.44
Coﬀee
# q25 q50 q75 ∞
23 q25 0.26 0.26 0.17 0.31
21 q50 0.38 0.24 0.24 0.14
20 q75 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.15
25 ∞ 0.20 0.08 0.28 0.44
Flour
# q25 q50 q75 ∞
21 q25 0.24 0.33 0.19 0.24
23 q50 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.17
23 q75 0.31 0.17 0.35 0.17
31 ∞ 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.58
See notes to Table 6.
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Figure 6: Rank Correlations (1,t)
26